

## **Regional Consensus on Political Settlement to the Principal Conflicts in Afghanistan**

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**Abstract** – This paper outlines a new strategy compatible with the existing peace process and Afghan government-Taliban dialogue. Starting in February 2020, per the terms of the agreement with the Taliban, the United States will begin withdrawing its troops. The Study Group believes establishing these circumstances by May 2021, when the treaty requires a troop pullout, will be difficult or impossible. A deadline extension is the first step toward a negotiated permanent peace that meets U.S. interests.

This paper proposes a peace-building U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan. The United States has made significant efforts to convene negotiations between the parties. We have to give in to the Taliban's requests and, more crucially, impose influence on our Afghan partners, who share our political outlook and have made huge sacrifices at our side for almost two decades. These debates are proceeding slowly.

- First, the United States should define success in Afghanistan, and
- second, it should clarify that the removal of American troops is contingent on this definition.
- The United States should support the Afghan government and the National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).
- The United States should employ an aggressive diplomatic policy to ensure the success of the peace process.
- To conclude, the Study Group suggests a comprehensive regional strategy as its fifth and final suggestion, which is also a key part of the new methodology.

*Keywords – Afghanistan, Conflict, Regional Consensus, Political Settlement, Crises*

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

To capitalize on optimistic indicators of progress toward a political process, an expanded international enterprise to endorse discussion should embark on a series of interrelated and made obsolete steps. To be efficacious, these would need to conduct business on multiple fronts simultaneously, reflecting the complicated nature of the situation. Communication and other measures to boost confidence come first. Because of its crucial importance in the current context, the increased focus is placed on this principal

first step. When the initial step (limiting military actions that will result in a general ceasefire) is successful, the second and third steps (more formal bargaining) will be significantly easier (Taye, 2021). Regional: Afghanistan's neighbors, as well as India, China, Russia, and the United States; simultaneous: Afghanistan and Pakistan; and governmental: the Afghan government and the Taliban (Khokhar, 2020). These three levels correspond to the facets of the disagreement where international mediators can have a significant impact. Because of the sophistication and changeability of the controversy, a neutral mediator can ensure that everyone is doing their component and that everything works out in the end. The effort made in 2013 to open an "office" for the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, illustrates the type of poorly organized and widely publicized "hurries to defeat" that have hampered previous initiatives. This "hurry to defeat" must be prevented for international players to be successful (World Bank, 2019). For the initial step to be successful, the world community must collaborate on all three levels to identify common ground optimism metrics that will demonstrate the trust required for the parties to accomplish meaningful progress. During an ongoing conflict, cleverly designed confidence-building measures can initiate to accelerate the recognition of deadlock and the advancement of a viable alternative path. As a first step, collaboration on vaccination programs, where there is a standard, or on trying to minimize civilian damage could be implemented (Verma, 2021). If optimism measures were gradually implemented and evaluated regularly, there would be less risk of giving up military and diplomatic advantages or raising unrealistic expectations. A reduced, high-reward strategy that begins small and builds toward larger goals has the potential to generate significant momentum and credibility. Process one could be taken a step further by attempting to agree on some main principles on which everyone could agree. This could be contended to have some foundation. The people of Afghanistan are exerting pressure on international actors, the Afghan government, and the Taliban to increase safety in the country (Sherman, 2019). Everyone wants to see foreign fighters leave, whether Arabs or Americans and everyone is committed to significantly lowering gross incompetence. Command structure exercised in illuminating Afghan legacy and Islamic values. Even though the more contentious issues of ideological transmission lines and any intercontinental military activities would have to be addressed later in the process, all international brands can agree, at least articulately, that they prefer a transcendental, stable, and neutral Afghanistan (Berdal, 2019). Furthermore, it supplied the protest's more rational figures with accessibility and a platform they lacked previously, exposing some Taliban representatives to opposing Afghan voices. However, to sell any form of involvement to their respective skeptic electorates, the Afghan government and the Taliban must see something positive "on the table." The international community could not lift sanctions against group members until after Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's return to Kabul and the end of the insurrection led by his faction (Barakat & Zyck, 2010). As a result, the regulation tower that appeared to be impeding advancement was quickly disassembled, demonstrating international partners' responsiveness and constructiveness when called upon. Although the Hekmatyar agreement is not a blueprint for negotiations with the much larger and more powerful Taliban movement, it does illustrate the possibility of achieving success with the correct balance of determination. International agencies must seek bottom-up opportunities to support a national dialogue. As important as they have been, continuing efforts to reform local government and High Peace Council institutional arrangements should be supported (Gibas-Krzak, 2021). In addition, a novel approach to the first stage might be for humanitarian groups to gather this information and then independently adapt their support for peace discussions at the local level. Attempts to mediate local resettlement between insurgents and lawmakers have resulted in major reductions in violence, as recounted in the article "Trying to broker Local Resettlement" on page. Galvanizing enough and effective assistance for local propositions in light of Afghanistan's current service cuts would be a

difficult task. One possible next step is the establishment of particular thread 'trial de-escalation zones,' which might direct to local ceasefires(Thomas, 2019a). The Afghan government's participation could be monitored and incentivized in beneficial ways. Such initiatives could motivate and inspire public support for peace, which could be channeled to insurgent and government leaders and managers (Ishchenko, 2021).

### 1.1.The Asia Foundation Political Settlements

The focus that the Foundation has put, for several decades now, on a way of development that is comparable to what we now refer to as a questioning style of help is something that the Foundation has maintained. When it is possible, programs are designed to be highly context-driven. This means that the programs are politically informed, rely on local ideas and initiatives, and are implemented in a way that allows for activities and deadlines to be adjusted as necessary in response to shifting conditions and new information. It is important to note that this programming style did not originate as a theoretical revelation that was subsequently operationalized; rather, it was a technique that gradually crystallized through a series of projects and theoretical investigations. It is important to note that this programming style did not originate as a theoretical revelation that was then operationalized. The Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States Congress have all contributed financial support to this endeavor. Other organizations, such as the European Union, have also contributed (Cole et al., 2016). In 2012, the Foundation received a grant of AUD 19.5 million, which was officially used to create the DFAT-TAF Partnership. This donation was made possible by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This collaborative effort was conceived as a "laboratory" to test whether or not a more adaptable, politically informed, and exploratory approach to aid could be successful in situations where more rigidly preplanned or purely technical approaches might fail. It included 21 programs in 12 countries and several regional programs (Bazeley, 2018).

### 1.2. Central Asian Leaders Urge Efforts to Settle Afghan Conflicts

#### 1.2.1 The Central Asia Regional Security Complex

Threats to state defense and regime stability, both from within and outside the jurisdictions, are a prevalent source of concern for residents of the California region. As illustrations of these shared dangers, terrorism, religious fanaticism, and criminal enterprises, including drug smuggling, are all mentioned. Rising religious fundamentalism, sometimes violent terrorist exercise, is mostly confined to a geographical area, orchestrated by groups with a clear and specific philosophy to overthrow secular totalitarian regimes, but also responding appropriately to repression or planning to exploit political and economic factors that result in demand; this paper discusses how each of these concerns is more than simply a cross-border danger brought into the country from an unstable neighbor(Tucker, 2022). Rising expectations in Russia and Europe, the financially rewarding and quick cash nature of attempting to transport during times when joblessness is at its highest for CA populations, a lack of border controls, corruption in law enforcement agencies, customs authorities, and border troops, and, in some cases, the vested interests of political elision all play a role in the escalation of narco-trafficking (Shcherbak, 2021b).

Even though CA and northern Afghanistan share ethnicity, language, and religion, borders created cultural and social contingent manifestations that aimed to separate populations from one another and place them on different historical paths of development. These manifestations were created to place

populations on different historical paths of development. 92% of Afghans have kept their deeply held religious views despite the secularization that has taken place among their neighbors in Central Asia (Pardabaev, 2022). In Afghanistan, despite the CA republics' highly regulated economic structure and the communist system, there was still a significant amount of small-scale business and agriculture centered on family units. By serving as interpreters for the Red Army during their invasion of Afghanistan, Central Asians were able to contribute to the mission's overall success. Before September 11, 2001, Central Asian states such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan had developed close relations with the Uzbek warlord Dostum and Ahmad Shah Masoud, including both, as a buffer against the Pakistan-backed Taliban. Central Asian representatives feared that Pakistan-backed Taliban would advance their Jihad in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 (Peers, 2018). The Taliban were accepted as the administration of Turkmenistan in part so that the country could preserve its status as a neutral state, but more significantly so that the construction of pipelines could go more smoothly via Afghanistan. Continued activities included smuggling illicit drugs and transporting goods without an agricultural license, soft furnishings, copyrighted works in Afghanistan, and manufactured lighting and automobiles in California. In 2001, nations in the CA region took a new look at the progress being made in Afghanistan (Bazan, 2021). It was believed that because of the global reach of the troops, the removal of the Taliban by the Northern Worldwide alliances coalition would result in a reduction in the amount of transnational trafficking. The CA republics saw an opportunity to receive material advantages from having to open their sovereign airspace and jurisdictions to the US and Coalition partners, as well as encouragement and assistance for their struggles against extremist organizations, so they decided to join the US-led war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in a more natural geographical area. This was done to take advantage of the US leading the war (Branco, 2020).

Most states in California have been hesitant to send soldiers to Afghanistan out of fear of retaliation from al Qaeda and the Taliban and alienating Russia by showing support for Kabul's government against its ethnic minority. This support would be directed against the country's Hazara people. They would prefer to avoid becoming engaged in the fighting, but they want to make as much money as possible from the continuing actions (Wikipedia, 2021). To quote Martha Olcott, the Russians want NATO to be successful in Afghanistan while "not remaining too long in Moscow's backyard, and, ideally, strengthening Moscow's influence in the process," which is why early NDN discussions were held with them. To put it another way, Russia wants the NATO alliance to succeed in Afghanistan, but only on the condition that it "doesn't stay too long in Moscow's backyard, and, ideally at least, to bolster Moscow's power in the process." Because Central Asians believe that Russia is better equipped to ensure their safety than NATO is, they have been forced to find a compromise between allying with NATO and attempting to avoid a conflict with Russia. As a result, this collaboration has not been without its share of difficulties (Shcherbak, 2021b).

### 1.2.2 Central Asian Interests in Afghanistan

The international Coalition sees the CA region as having been increasingly crucial to Afghanistan in three ways, with a possible fourth way being added on: Because evacuating via Pakistan is fraught with peril, its primary function is a trustworthy and safe transit hub for the NDN. This is of utmost significance, given the precarious nature of that route. Second, the state of California's investment opportunities in mass transit, oil and gas pipelines, and energy infrastructure may be able to revitalize regional trade and transportation routes (Tucker, 2022). This is related to the United States' participation in the New Silk Road project, which was discussed at a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly with

Afghanistan's neighbors, intergovernmental institutions, and funders in September 2011, as well as the TAPI project, which aims to meet the natural gas needs of Pakistan and India. Both projects were discussed concerning this issue. Thirdly, the racial component of CA involvement has not been systematically examined to tap into interrelated networks with non-Pashtun populations and political organizations in Afghanistan. This is even though such an examination would be necessary to progress toward the goal (Pardabaev, 2022). In response to a NATO attack that occurred in November 2011 and resulted in the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers stationed on the Afghan border, the Pakistani government demanded that the United States vacate the Shamsi Air Base located in the Baluchistan area. This caused the CA republics to start maybe talking about other areas for drones to operate (Shcherbak, 2022). There are currently five points on which the CA countries can agree regarding peace and security in Afghanistan.



Fig. 1 (Central Asia Electricity Trade Brings Economic Growth and Fosters Regional Cooperation, 2022)

- Conventional forces cannot resolve the Afghan dispute, and the Allied forces' strategy for achieving peace in the home nation will fail. In their opinion, electronic surveillance should take priority over armed intervention, and national reunification is the best way to achieve a political solution.
- Those incentives such as fighting poverty, unemployment, and Afghans' quality of life, among other things, should be given preference to reach stability through economic restructuring and thus "security through regional integration."
- Any solution to Afghanistan's problems must be compatible with the country's women's Islamic faith and culture.
- All parties, such as the Afghan government, must also participate in Afghanistan talks. In addition to Taliban representatives, legislators from the Northern Alliance ought to be present, resulting in an energy agreement between the diverse ethnic groups.
- They also highlight the importance of the UN and its attached agencies playing more active roles. According to Turkmen President Berdymuhamedov, the only way out of this crisis is via implementing contracts with UNAMA and UNRCCA.
- Due to Afghanistan's ongoing insecurity, the state of California is exposed to potential threats and opportunities stemming from the country. Afghanistan is a breeding ground for the propagation of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, as well as the trafficking of illegal drugs and weapons. As a result of the stabilization and reconstruction efforts, there may be an opportunity to collaborate

on infrastructures such as utilities, mass transit, agriculture, and sustainable sources(Shcherbak, 2021a).

### 1.2.3. Cooperation as Risk Prevention

CA countries recognize efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, citing concerns about the prospective threat to national safety and military dictatorship survival posed by the transborder sexual exploitation of illegal drugs, arms, radicalization, and terrorism. The 1,458-mile (2,246-kilometer) border with Afghanistan provides more opportunities for insurgent infiltration and drug smuggling than the Border regions. Balkh, Kunduz, Baghlan, Badghis, and Faryab, all previously safe provinces near CA borders, are now threatened as the Taliban advance north and west(Samay, 2020). However, because of the ongoing insecurity in Afghanistan, CA representatives can also use the safeguard assertion to maintain power. CA's government thought joining GWoT would make the US less crucial in its human-rights violations. While the environmental factors of California's crime problem receive more interest, the internal factors of the state should not be overlooked. Terrorism is a threat in the area due to both demand and supply factors supply, through links between potentially illegal trade, illicit drugs, and radicalization (either in Pakistan's southern provinces or by the immigrant community in Russia); and requirement due to persecution, marginalization, social alienation, and joblessness (especially among the young)(Novikova, 2019). Russia, which has accused the US and NATO of purposefully killing them by failing to take adequate action to limit sowing and human smuggling, is another process by the CA countries and Russia regarding drug smuggling along the national road believed to have originated in Afghanistan. Concerns have been expressed in CA countries that narco-trafficking profits could be used to fund insurgents seeking to destabilize legitimate governments. For example, Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies have been held responsible for the unease in the government's southern region regarding Afghan drug money funding local Islamist militants(Krashennnikova, 2019).

Similarly, Uzbek legislators have laid the blame for the 2005 uprising in Andijan firmly on the shoulders of the Afghan government. However, as Andrew Kuchins and Thomas Sanderson figure out, narco smugglers continue operating "with official collusion, if not collusion," making the situation even murkier. Martha Olcott refers to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as "narco-states" because of the pervasiveness of organized crime in the two countries' governmental systems (Minatti & Duyvesteyn, 2020). Since it is impossible to provide conclusive evidence of a connection between the two, very little consideration or inquiry has been devoted to the subject. Lastly, the potential conflict over cross-border water supplies is another reason to collaborate with Afghanistan. Afghanistan constantly needs water, especially during droughts, and it shares river basins with California on the Amu Darya and the Pyanj. This makes Afghanistan an important water supplier to California. Afghanistan has used just under a fraction of the nine million cubic meters of water annually that it is entitled to under a 1946 peace treaty signed by King Zahir Shah and the Soviet Union(Dr. Muhammad Ali, Malik Safdar, 2021). Suppose Afghanistan spends all of its CA allocations on infrastructure projects. It may cause conflict with its neighbors, such as Tajikistan, since the Pyanj River flows into the Amu Darya, Uzbekistan. As Afghanistan's security improves, irrigation water consumption is likely to rise. For management to be based on a fair allocation of water, Afghanistan would need to join the International Stocks for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS), the only joint committee that brings together all five CA states to try to find fair solutions for water dispersal in the region (Novikova, 2019). In aspects of hydropower development, Afghanistan has ambitious ambitions for the upcoming decade to two decades, with plans to build both

large and medium-sized hydroelectric power stations. Simply put, this aggravates tensions between CA countries, which are currently at odds over dam construction and water distribution (Umarov, 2021).

#### 1.2.4. Cooperation for New Opportunities

From the point of view of the CA nations, a collaborative effort with Afghanistan is motivated by the same desire for new opportunities. The market holds is not insignificant. Public statements from CA states emphasize progression and the need to eliminate poverty regarding national stability and security. By proposing the same remedy for Afghanistan, they can avoid support for the military solution desired by Coalition forces and sculpt out a position in the conflict. Many people in California and South Asia are optimistic about Afghanistan's future as a trading and transportation center (Ishbuldina, 2019). They are eager to participate in regional trade methods that will enable them to locate market opportunities in the south for their raw material and energy exports to boost their independence from Russia. These objectives perfectly align with the New Silk Road plan for deeper integration around Afghanistan. Asian Development Bank and World Bank-backed Central Asia-South Asia Regional Power Market-CASAREM were expected to allow massive surplus electricity imports from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan during the summer months (Pardabaev, 2022). This paved the way for Afghanistan to receive electricity. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is currently undertaking a feasibility study for CASA 1000, the first process of this ambitious project, which is set to begin in 2012. Concerns have been voiced by civil society groups in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that the construction of CASA 1000 would reduce local electricity production and increase costs. The political climate is also significant: A Power Purchase Agreement was signed between Tajikistan and Afghanistan in 2008, authorizing the export of 300 MW of Tajik electricity to Afghanistan annually. However, exports have been very low due to the severe electricity crisis in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan's obstruction of the contentious Rogun hydroelectric project (Mohd Saleem et al., 2021). Ironically, the CA shallow groundwater countries, which are at odds during the warmer months due to water supply problems, have autonomously considered electricity transfers to Afghanistan if the upriver countries have difficulty exporting electricity to Afghanistan. Since 2009, Uzbekistan has been sending 150 MW per year to Kabul, thanks to an Asian Development Financial institution line that runs from Khairaton to Kabul via Pul i-Khumri.

To provide Afghanistan with electricity, Turkmenistan constructed the Balkh region's power generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure. Through exports of electricity and continued investment in road and rail infrastructure, CA countries hope to increase their access to international trade (Sabzalieva, 2021). Tajikistan built five bridges across the Pyanj River with help from the United States and the Agha Khan Network. The Asian Development Bank was in charge of awarding the construction contract for the railway that would link Khairaton and Mazar-i Sharif, both of which are located in Uzbekistan. Wheat, fertilizer, metal roll, and even petroleum are among the goods that Uzbekistan exports to Afghanistan. Kazakhstan is the only country in the CA with a comprehensive assistance program for reconstructing Afghanistan. This is even though it has no geographical boundaries with Afghanistan. Additionally included in the program are initiatives about water storage, infrastructure development, and the shipment of cement and other building supplies to Afghanistan (Nazirov & Mukhammadsidiqov, 2020).

#### 2.1. Gulf's importance to Afghanistan

Due to their unique bonds, proximity, shared democratic structure based on Islamic beliefs, shared destiny, and common goals, the states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates signed a treaty to form the Gulf Cooperation Council-GCC on May 25, 1981, in Riyadh,

Saudi Arabia. Area-wise, it's now 2,672,700 sq. km. Unofficial government and corporate communications are conducted in Arabic (Erfan, 2021).



Fig. 2 (Representatives from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Met with Representatives from the de Facto Authorities in Afghanistan, on Monday, 14 February 2022, in Doha, the State of Qatar, 2022)

Riyadh prioritizes attempting to prevent Iranian influence throughout the region. Afghanistan represents one of the best and lengthiest opportunities available as a part of the geographic balance of power policy. Maintaining a delicate power imbalance in the Islamic world and the Middle East is a heavy responsibility for Saudi Arabia. There are many possible areas for cooperation to explore when the similarities and requirements of both parties are taken into account (Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia)(Khalilzad, 2019). Given the current state of affairs, it is critical to be aware of the major impact Saudi Arabia has had on Afghanistan's political climate. Considering the stakes, it stands to reason that these two countries would be strong allies. In this instance, the fact that both nations are predominantly Muslim illustrates their common cultural values and implies that the two should collaborate to protect and support each other's preferences (Giustozzi, 2019).

### **The main principles in the first circle of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy are as follows**

- I am making the Persian Gulf a secure and safe area.
- I was going to remove external and internal threats to the autonomy of the Persian Gulf.
- Keeping out of their domestic matters is a top priority.
- Strengthening ties between GCC countries and Saudi Arabia
- GCC policy coordination on an international and regional scale
- Taking prompt action to resolve disputes between many council members, such as those that transcend national boundaries.
- Embrace and collaborate regional fiscal plans concerning the region's oil reserves Sadat Roqia, undated (89 AH/1380 in Arabic) (Farias, 2020).

### **2.2. RAND Corporation - peace agreement for Afghanistan**

After the majority of US powers have left Afghanistan, the authors of this research look at the Iranian presence there and the implications for the US. Iran wields considerable power in Afghanistan due to its economic, political, and cultural clout. Suppose the Iranian nuclear recession is not settled. An armed services clash between the United States and Iran is a distinct possibility if tensions between the two countries reach that level. Closer coordination between Iran and the US in Afghanistan is more likely now, thanks to the election of Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the prospect of progress in nuclear negotiations (Lyozin, 2019). An Iranian and American victory over the Taliban would benefit Afghanistan's stability, and both countries have a vested interest in preventing it. Afghanistan's future remains uncertain following the United States' withdrawal in 2016. The United States is expected to keep



funding Kabul's government agencies like the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan National Police. However, the stability of Afghanistan is highly questionable. Insurgents in Kabul are likely to profit from the withdrawal of US and international forces (Peric, 2021).

Financial difficulties are another obstacle that Afghanistan's government will have to overcome in the coming years. Afghanistan's economy heavily depends on foreign funding, and many Afghan businesses benefit from U.S. and ISAF military actions. Despite its numerous natural resources, Afghanistan's manufacturing industry is virtually nonexistent. Afghanistan appears to rely on the illicit economy, particularly opium production, rather than importing fruit and vegetables, nuts, rugs, and semi-precious stones (Carlson et al., 2021).

However, corruption among government officials may be Afghanistan's most serious problem. After the presidential election in 2014, it is quite unlikely that Hamid Karzai and his allies would give up all of their authority. Although Karzai cannot seek reelection, there are indications that he expects to be able to form a new government in his image. The RAND survey found widespread skepticism among Afghans regarding the reliability of free and fair elections. According to a poll by the Asia Foundation, Afghanistan's third worst problem after self-doubt and joblessness in 2011 was bribery. Remote regions outside the Afghan government's control may experience the consequences of potential destabilization in Afghanistan more starkly than cities. Research from the Asia Foundation backs up the claim of a former Afghan official that "the country's progress since 2001 has never reached the hamlet. As a result, remote regions remain in similar scenarios to those that existed before and under Taliban rule, which makes them more susceptible to conflict following the drawdown. Pakistan may attempt to take advantage of this (Lyozin, 2019).

### 2.2.1 Iran's Political Role in Afghanistan

Iran has always been aware of the urgency of the situation in Afghanistan, even before the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Concerned about the growth of communism in Afghanistan, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, provided financial and military help to several Afghan factions. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which toppled the Shah, shared these concerns. The Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while wearing the robes of a hypothetical faqih to support the Islamic Revolution (a precedent set by the supreme court in a certain jurisdiction) (Verma, 2022b). Various schools of thought did exist among Afghanistan's Shia ulema at the time about the role of religion in government, with those who supported Khomeini receiving the most support from Tehran. Hezb-e Wahdat, the Afghan political party of the Hazara minority, arose from some Iranian-backed Shia organizations. However, due to internal strife and Saddam Hussein's incursion in 1980, the Islamic Republic's resources and attention were drawn away from their eastern neighbor. Iran was involved in the organizing and leadership of the Afghan Shia Mujahideen.

In contrast, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States provided the largest aid to the Sunni-dominated Afghan Mujahideen. Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union and the overthrow of the Najibullah government in 1992, Iranian involvement in Afghanistan increased (Dr. Ghulam Mustafa et al., 2020). Iran was in an improved situation to invest in broadening its influence sphere in Afghanistan after winning the war with Iraq in 1988. For a decade, from 1992 to 1996, Tehran implemented numerous Mujahideen factions competing for power in Afghanistan, particularly in Kabul, the capital city. Since it supported the Kabul government and Hezb-e Wahdat, which occasionally engaged in a violent struggle with the national government, Iran's approach to Afghanistan was flexible. The Allied Forces (or

Northern Front), an Afghan opposition party led by influential Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara men from northern Afghanistan, received support from Iran after the Taliban's quick victory in 1996 (Verma, 2022a). Under the Taliban, the connection between Iran and Afghanistan was strained at best. The Wahhabi religious doctrine spread by Saudi Arabia significantly affected the Taliban, leading them to regard Shia-majority Iran as heretical. Intimate relations exist between Tehran and Kabul due to the Taliban's persecution of Afghan Shia, especially the Hazara (Pardabaev, 2022).

The Taliban and the combatants never fought each other. More than ever, the Northern Alliance appeared to be Tehran's best hope. The Islamic Republic joined Russia and India as major supporters of the anti-Taliban movement. There was widespread concern that a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic government in the province would threaten the peace and safety of all three nations. This is because it would make the newly independent governments of Central Asia less attractive to trading partners and investors from outside (Garbuzarova, 2021). Iran used an opening presented by the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to expand its regional influence. After American and Northern Alliance soldiers' swift removal of the Taliban, Tehran no longer faced an unbeatable opponent. The Northern Alliance and its allies took control of Kabul with the help of the United States. However, problems were complicated by the country's diverse population. Northern Alliance MPs were mostly composed of Dari speakers, whereas Pashtuns only accounted for around 40% of Afghanistan's total population. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun from a prestigious family who is also well-educated, is now the leader in the race for the president of Afghanistan. Because they sought to impose their own religious and cultural worldview on the new administration, the Northern Alliance government was opposed to appointing a Pashtun leader (Afzali et al., 2019)

### 2.2.2. Iran's Positive Economic Influence

Iran desires peace with Afghanistan, given its actions since 2001 toward its neighboring nation. Since 2002, a large percentage of Iran's over \$500 million pledged economic aid to Afghanistan had been spent on roads, the power grid, and schools. President Karzai and the Afghan government see Iran's role in the economic as beneficial. Regarding international trade, Iran is a major partner for Afghanistan. Although this may not appear to be a substantial percentage when compared to US standards, the fact that trade volume between Iran and Afghanistan managed to reach nearly \$5 billion in 2013 demonstrates the two countries' strong financial ties (Ra'ees & Kamal, 2017). Trade between Afghanistan and Iran is unbalanced, even though Afghanistan depends on Iran for fuel and oil. The Islamic Republic of Iran ships concrete, asphalt, oil, and food to Afghanistan. According to reports, roughly 75% of tradable products traded between Iran and its poorer roommate Afghanistan are Iranian exports. This results in a significant trade surplus for Iran. Afghanistan's smaller commercial and industrial base is largely to blame. Iran has occasionally used its economic and political power for partisan advantage (Verma, 2022b). Overall, Iran's economic ties with Afghanistan are advantageous, despite the reality that the suspension of Iranian fuel export markets to Afghanistan during the 2010-2011 cold season negatively impacted ordinary Afghans' lives. Iran will also help other countries build Afghanistan via economic ties. To facilitate Indian commerce with Afghanistan and Central Asia, the country is actively assisting Iran in building the Chabahar port on the Oman Sea. Iran and India want to construct roads and railroads to connect Chabahar with Afghanistan (Mustafa & Khan, 2020).

Working with India allows Tehran to reduce Western sanctions while increasing its regional influence. However, Afghanistan will benefit in the long run. The Kabul government is cautious of its neighborhood Pakistan, but as its western states develop, Afghanistan will become less economically and politically

dependent on Pakistan. Iran-Afghanistan advertising aspects may be consistent with US aims in Afghanistan, particularly considering the uncertain future of the Afghan economy after the 2016 withdrawal (Dobbins & Timofeev, 2019).

### 2.2.3. Iran's Anti-U.S. Policies in Afghanistan

Iran's new approach to Afghanistan is consistent with broader American goals. Iran has done good things for the US but has also done some bad. Since the Khatami government took office, Iran's attitude toward the US military presence in Afghanistan has shifted from a preliminary welcome to lingering anger and fatigue. As a result of the author's nuclear program, tensions between the United States and Iran have been rising. The Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guards are staunchly opposed to any American military presence in the region around Iran (Ahmadian, 2021). Iran is particularly concerned that American troops encamped in Afghanistan could strike its nuclear facilities.

Furthermore, Tehran claims that the US is trying to conduct foreign intelligence and subvert operational processes against Iran while using Afghan territory. During the December 2011 crash of a US Predator drone in Iran, the Iranian authorities claimed the drone had entered Iranian airspace from Afghanistan. Because of this, it shouldn't be shocking that Iran is against any permanent American military presence in Afghanistan. A long-standing framework for cooperation between the United States and Afghanistan was formed by the US-Afghan Strategic Agreement, which the Iranian government tried to undermine (Azizi et al., 2020).

Iran funds many Afghan politicians and NGOs, together with religious leaders. According to an ex-government official in Afghanistan, Iran has backed several other powerful Afghans, along with the potent warlord and existing Afghan Vice President Mohammed Fahim. According to a second former Afghan official that we spoke with, Iranian money is used to "buy" support for certain goals, such as attendance at an event commemorating Iran's goal of "empowering" Palestine by freeing it from Israeli occupation on Quds Day. This particular event was held to mark Iran's goal of "empowering" Palestine (also known as Jerusalem Day) (Dadras, Taghizade, et al., 2020). "Funds can buy them no matter who it is," says this official. The Iranian government has continued to pay its employees despite its economic crisis. They pay every single one of us.

On the other hand, Iran's pressure on the Afghan government is not always effective. On May 2, 2012, the United States and Afghanistan reached a business strategy agreement, and Tehran could not persuade Kabul to withdraw (Dadras, Dadras et al., 2020). There is a slim chance that the government of Afghanistan would give in to pressure from Iran and agree to a reduction in the number of US troops stationed in Afghanistan. It would appear that Tehran will have to maintain its current level of tolerance for a continued Western and American military presence in Afghanistan for the time being. Additionally, Iran has made significant efforts to establish a soft power presence in Afghanistan, which it then uses regularly to undermine the United States' goals. Iranian funds have been used to establish and strengthen pro-Iranian news organizations, madrasahs, and schools. This activity is concentrated in Kabul and throughout the nation's western and northern regions. Iran's efforts to persuade the Tajik and Hazara people have taken the central stage. The Shia community in Afghanistan is an aim of the Islamic Republic's efforts to increase religious freedom. More specifically, Tehran attempts to make a revolutionary ideology the standard among Afghan Shia (Dadras et al., 2021). Iran has built and refurbished a huge number of learning facilities in Afghanistan. Iran has also agreed to donate thousands of curriculums to these classrooms, some of which are politically or ideologically neutral. On the other

hand, other educational materials in Iran do not conceal their ideological and political agenda. If Iran continues to provide textbooks and scholarly journals to Afghanistan's educational institutions, particularly universities, its influence may be reinforced for decades (Jauhiainen & Eyvazlu, 2020).

#### 2.2.4. Iran's Military Aid to Afghan Insurgents

Iran has provided the Taliban with military aid in the form of light weapons, RPGs, and training for Taliban influence on Iranian soil. This assistance, however, has not been as considerable as Iran's assistance to Shia insurgents in Iraq, who have slaughtered thousands of US troops. Iran has lesser relations with the Taliban in terms of military and intelligence than it has with other anti-American groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon (Shafaei & Block, 2022). Since the Taliban are Sunni extremists at war with Iran's Shia majority may be significant. The credibility of Iran with certain factions of the Taliban could be bolstered, better communication could be established with the Pashtun population of Afghanistan, and Iran's influence and power could be increased with the Afghan central government, all without significantly straining bilateral relations.

Furthermore, it demonstrates to the United States what the Iranian military can do to American forces in Afghanistan in the case of an all-out military conflict. Iran's suspected backing for Afghan militants may be related to Iran's war against Baluchi separatist insurgents in the country's southwest (Modrzejewska-Leśniewska, 2020). The Sunni Baluch is one of Iran's most persecuted ethnic minorities, living in southeastern Iran near the nation's territory with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even during the shah's rule, the region of Iranian Baluchistan remained economically backward and fiercely independent of Tehran. The Islamic Republic has suppressed the Baluchi individuals in response to their social and economic demands, particularly during Ahmadinejad's presidency.

Even major Baluchi towns like Zahedan have Farsi-speaking Iranians stationed there as part of Tehran's Persianization effort. These factors have resulted in a rise in the conflict in Iranian Baluchistan in recent years (Naseh et al., 2018). A suicide bombing in Pishin asserted by the Sunni extremist Baluchi insurgent group Jundallah, which the Iranian government has repeatedly alleged of getting assistance from the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, killed several senior Revolutionary Guard commanders. Despite Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei's claims that Iran has intercepts proving US conspiracy, there is no hard proof that the US has backed Jundallah. It's possible that Israel or Saudi Arabia helped the Iranian Baluchis and other groups trying to fight the Islamic Republic. To damage Iran's nuclear program and eliminate Iranian scientists, there is evidence that Israel collaborated with Iranian Kurdish terrorists and the Mujahedin-e Khalq group. In the past, Saudi Arabia supported Sunni groups associated with Tehran (Taherifard et al., 2021).

#### 2.2.5. Challenges to Iranian Influence in Afghanistan

Iran undoubtedly has a significant impact on Afghan affairs. With greater religious and cultural ties among the Afghan people, it is a more formidable political force than nations like the United States, Russia, or India. The economies of Iran and Afghanistan are interwoven, and Iranian officials maintain close ties to the Afghan government and powerful militias and warlords. To think, however, that Iran's sway in Afghanistan is unchallenged would be foolish. More and more important, Afghans are speaking out against Iran's presence in their country (Roosbeh et al., 2018). Many Afghans are dissatisfied with Iran's support for the Taliban and its paramilitary forces and with Tehran's political pressure on Kabul. Tensions between Afghanistan and Iran have arisen in recent years due to the migration of Afghan

refugees into Iran and arguments over water rights and the importation of drugs from Afghanistan. Even after most US and ISAF troops leave Afghanistan, Iran will face greater constraints, despite the reality that it may be a significant player (Roosbeh et al., 2018).

### 2.3. NSI Negotiated Settlement in Afghanistan

The power to regulate the legitimate use of power is a distinguishing feature of states. Despite unprecedented US financing in Afghanistan's security sector, the Afghan government can still not assert complete responsibility for the nation's safety. Afghanistan's security sector relies more on foreign assistance than the remaining portion of the nation's civilian government. The ANDSF's continued survival is critical to the country's growth and development, and US support makes the fund's continued existence possible. Even though security obligations were formally transferred to the Afghan government in 2013 and most U.S. combat missions were concluded in 2014, the ANDSF continues to rely heavily on US assistance, which accounts for 80% of all government security spending in Afghanistan and 85% of all economic aid for security (Dr. Muhammad Tariq et al., 2021). The United States highly depends on the Afghan government to cover the Afghan National Army's salaries (ANA). In addition to these spending obligations, the US provides the Ministry of Defense with material assistance, purchasing expert knowledge, and policy advice. The United States' semiannual reports to Congress The Department of Defense's report on Afghanistan's stability and security details consistent advancement, but one that falls below expectations. As a result, the ANDSF's alternative methods against the Taliban are hampered by the force's incapacity and inefficiency (Santucci, 2022). This has put the ANDSF on the defensive against the Taliban, preventing them from ensuring the security of most citizens. Despite this, surveys like the Asia Foundation's 2019 Survey of the Afghan People have consistently shown that Afghans see the ANA as one of the country's most influential institutions. Despite its many challenges, the Afghan National Defense and Security Force-ANDSF have the potential to become a symbol of the legacy left by the United States forces in Afghanistan. Military operations by the United States and NATO were ended, but the security forces remained cohesive and ready to fight the Taliban (Reis et al., 2021).

The ANDSF is now doing a large percentage of the trying to fight against the Taliban, and they will pay the price in terms of casualties. Afghanistan's national army and supplementary forces, and provide this militia, were primarily crafted, provided with training, kitted, and sponsored by the United States between 2002 and 2014. Beginning in 2006, the United States military trained most of the Afghan National Police-ANP. Although several nations have contributed to the UN Law and Order Trust Fund, the United States has provided the vast majority of the money thus far. However, Germany and the European Union have sponsored police wages and non-lethal equipment and have maintained a training plan for chosen police officers (Leu et al., 2019). Due to the ongoing insurgency, the US chose to "build up strong police as a regionalized defense force" rather than focus on promoting an established police force. Some police forces in Afghanistan have shown their efficiencies, such as the Afghan National Civil Order Police and the Border Police. However, corruption and abuse of power continue to plague the policing sector, which comprises official units and informal militia. Up until the handover of power in June 2013, US forces fought alongside ANA units to combat the Taliban. By 2008, the US had also begun constructing the Afghan Air Force. As the insurgency grew, the government authorized a larger and bigger military to combat it. The importance of career development and institutional frameworks, especially at the government level, was neglected in favor of the explosive growth of the army and police ranks. After President Obama revealed in 2011 that it was scheduled to hand over responsibilities to the ANDSF in

2014, U.S. training initiatives for the ANDSF had to be increased. This was required so that the ANDSF could take around protection in 2014 and the US could withdraw (Dr. Muhammad Tariq et al., 2021).

#### 2.4. Tashkand declaration fundamental principles peaceful settlement conflict Afghanistan

On July 19, 1999, the "Six plus Two," consisting of the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, met in Tashkent with the participation of the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General (Miller & Blake, 2019).

The continuing military struggle in Afghanistan is a major worry for governments worldwide because of the danger it represents to global peace and security. Remembering the 'talking points' and 'points of common understanding' previously adopted by the 'Six plus Two' countries, we reaffirm our dedication to a peaceful political settlement of the Afghan conflict following the relevant provisions of resolutions and decisions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (Miller & Blake, 2019).

All of us here at this table are committed to seeing the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan succeed, and we agree that the United Nations must continue to play a central and impartial role in international efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan. To bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan, we would want to work with you. We reaffirm our dedication to Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. We are outraged by the continued violation of international humanitarian law and human rights, particularly the rights of women and girls in Afghanistan (Miller & Blake, 2019).

Researchers are very upset by the growing rates of drug manufacture, trafficking, and production, as well as the unlawful sale of weapons since these crimes have far-reaching, detrimental impacts on the area and beyond. In addition, we are concerned about the proliferation of illicit gun sales. In addition, we are concerned about the fact that the Taliban are using Afghan land as a place to conceal terrorists and provide them with training. This practice has grave ramifications in Afghanistan, its neighbors, and beyond the nation's boundaries (Miller & Blake, 2019).

#### 2.5. Relations with Azerbaijan political significance

There is no evidence to suggest that the fallout from the war between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan significantly affected the course of the Tajik conflict. In this paper, we disassociate the effects of governance, the refugee, border, and ammunition and arms systems, as well as the Russian perspective. Because their distributed governance was able to control their forces effectively, the Afghans were capable of withstanding Soviet intervention in components (Mousavi, Tabibian et al., 2019). Afghanistan's current administration is fighting a war, a rebellion over the nation's shape and future, with at least one or two of its members involved in the dispute in the neighborhood of Tajikistan. Afghan groups supplied the Tajik opponents with small munitions and weapons from their vast supplies. Because of the boundary between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, rebel fighters in Tajikistan could establish themselves and maintain their numbers through refugee camps. Russia's support for Tajikistan's former communist government stems partly from knowledge gained in Afghanistan. These three factors provide a consistent framework for examining the Afghan conflict's impact on the Tajikistan dispute (The United Nations, 2019).

During a recent visit to Baku, former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates expressed gratitude to Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev for "their contribution in Afghanistan, maybe not in aspects of the soldiers they have - and also a civilian presence - but [by supplying] mass transit and authorizing overflights." Azerbaijan's foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov, has stated that his country is prepared to react to Afghan stabilization efforts by increasing the number of people dispatched to Afghanistan in 2009. This contrasts with the humanitarian relief already offered to Afghanistan, such as physicians and engineers (Mousavi, Dayer et al., 2019).

Afghanistan has taken a position supporting Azerbaijan as the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, which has been brewing for a long time, has erupted into war between Azerbaijan and Armenia (UNDP, 2019).

### 2.5.1 Afghan Leadership Impact

An investigation of the war's leadership effectiveness reveals important links to the subsequent Tajik Civil War. The Afghan opposition, like the Tajik resistance, arose in the 1970s from security forces' dissent political protest groups. While Goodson is correct that the Soviet Union could not launch a serious assault on the Afghan public due to the country's "classic dissension," his assessment also implies that there are numerous Afghan rulers with the ability to influence events in Tajikistan. Look to the young military commanders who fought against the Soviet/Kabul troops within Afghanistan, he suggests, because they'll most likely take over the country after the war (UNDP, 2019). Their continued existence on the frontlines in Afghanistan and their ability to wield power in Tajikistan is facilitated by a combination of clan loyalty, military capabilities, and regional interests. These Afghan officials have expressed an interest in international issues. In September 1994, Islamists allied with Hekmatyar in the Caucasus, recognized as mujahidin, led Azeri attacks on Dzhebrail. The Afghan government provided safe havens to Tajik opposition figures who had fled their country in Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kunduz. Afghan leaders provide religious literature, weapons systems, mentorships, meal, pharmaceuticals, and emotional support to the Tajik opposition (Mousavi, Dayer et al., 2019). The government's primary focus on taking possession of the Afghan state remains the real impediment to these Afghan "foreign politics" efforts. Despite these constraints, they are an important resource for the Tajik opposition. Ahmed Shah Masoud and Abdul Rashid Dostum, two major Afghan leaders, have been at the center of Afghanistan's engagement in Tajikistan's civil war. Most observers regard Masoud as a fundamentalist when, particularly in comparison to other, more sensible leaders in Afghanistan's power structure. He rules over most of Afghanistan, along with its borders with Tajikistan and the independent Gorno-Badakhshan region (Mosamim & Sugandi, 2020). Masoud's numerous advantages enable him to wield considerable power in Tajikistan (military knowledge, planning, and control over the Tajik population in Afghanistan). Masoud's influence on the Tajik opposition can be traced back to March 1992. When Nabiev arrested Dushanbe's mayor, the Tajik opposition soared up in retaliation, and his strikes on Kabul were an essential precursor to the Tajikistan Civil War. After progovernment troops decided to drive them south out of Tajikistan, Masoud backed refugee camps and began military training for the opposing political party in them. The opposition can freely move into Tajikistan from Masoud's place of refuge in Afghanistan, particularly all along the Pyandzh River in Gorno-Badakhshan. The Tajik opposition cannot continue its military campaign against the Tajik government without Masoud's assistance (Martinez et al., 2020).

### 2.5.2. Afghan border impact

The Tajikistan-Afghanistan border affected how the battle unfolded. Central Asia's background and current predicament offer lessons. The Tajik resistance was able to revive and rebuild owing to refugees. Powerful Afghan leaders dominate these independent border regions (Masoud and Dostum). The weak border allows easy entry of personnel, guns, and drugs for Afghanistan's opposition. Without this important, easily-reachable region, Tajik opponents would die. Basmachi was the first time the Soviet Union met border irregulars (Mostowlansky, 2017). The author adds that early Muslim insurgents "often functioned from a compassionate Afghanistan." Soviet counterinsurgency doctrine analyses the Basmachi insurrection and others in Lithuania, Ukraine, and Afghanistan (Dr. Muhammad Tariq et al., 2020). Afghanistan was different because it needed foreign help (provided across the Pakistani and Iranian borders). Former Pakistani ambassador to China Maqbool A. Bhatti emphasizes Afghanistan's location in Central Asia.

The Afghan border is important for trade and Islamic authority in Afghanistan. Historical and modern causes make the Afghan border strategic for the Tajik opposition. Goodson recommends a warfare scenario in which "insurgents find support, asylum, and foundation areas among many refugees" His model considers deteriorating domestic conditions, porous borders, external actors, refugee population size and coherence, and host country refugee and international policies (Ubaidulloev, 2014). His study reveals that refugee-led insurgencies spread and globalize warfare. The Tajikistan Civil War fits Goodson's Afghan-initiated model. Almost every simulated characteristic describes shared elements. Despite Afghanistan's lesser refugee influx, refugee camps sprang up in Pakistan and Tajikistan.

Artificial divisions. Pakistan's Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees said most Masoud and Dostum refugees are Tajiks and Uzbeks escaping Tajikistan. In each case, insurgent soldiers crossed the border, conducted military activities, and withdrew to their encampment, allowing another group to cross. Shared Islamic principles and philosophy helped both situations across borders. While the UN's assistance of refugee camps in Pakistan and Dostam's where No sponsorships in Mazar-i Sharif, are both examples of foreign humanitarian help, the level of support varies significantly (Y. Ali et al., 2021). Afghan camps in Northwest Pakistan established a de facto expatriate state of Afghanistan with its currencies and a shared desire to topple the occupying government. Northern Afghanistan's Tajik and Uzbek camps don't get as much worldwide attention or aid as the Afghan situation; thus, they won't grow as large. Refugees continue to help a large part of Tajikistan's opposition. Tajikistan fits Goodson's model. Both Tajikistan and Afghanistan have "fiefdoms" that want power and authority. Afghanistan and Tajikistan lack border control. Each region is independent. Competing interests also utilize the space between governments. Pakistani and Western impacts are well-documented in Afghan refugee camps. Uzbekistan is using General Dostum to create a border protection zone similar to Israel's South Lebanon Army. Pamiris, who want an independent Gorno-Badakhshan, control a large chunk of the Tajik-Afghan border (Sadozai, 2021).

The drug trade is essential to autonomous border communities' economies. Kabul's ineffectiveness has led to a thriving drug trade in northern Afghanistan. This allowed local warlords to arm themselves and strengthened their control. Central Asia's independence and turmoil boosted the drug trade. Russian, Tajik, and Kirgiz border guards assist move narcotics from Afghanistan through Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan region. One writer blames a shortage of international funding for Tajikistan's growing drug trade, stating that local military commanders have no other option. The Tajik Civil War "mostly" disseminated weapons (McPherson-Smith, 2022). The 21st MRD either did little to impede or actively



supported the pro-communist and Kulyabi abduction of firearms from Russian garrisons as the situation in Tajikistan deteriorated across the summer of 1992. Insurgents possibly received weapons from a Soviet stockpile when they fled Afghanistan (and evacuated through Tajikistan). Weapons are smuggled over many Central Asian borders. According to sources, Afghanistan weapons the Tajik resistance in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan arms General Dostum in Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan arms Gorno-Badakhshan (Levi-Sanchez, 2018).

### III. CONCLUSION

Internal dynamics explain why foreign parties want a stable and peaceful region. The withdrawal and its likely results and aftereffects affect the negotiated settlement in Afghanistan and regional reconciliation. Thus, it's important to consider both. Military transformation and diplomacy, economic sustainability, robust national structures for personality, and a strong ANSF from within are essential to a positive outcome in Afghanistan. These goals can only be achieved through protection, ceasefire operations in Afghanistan, intercontinental assistance for the country's transition of power, and political agreements that aim to reach practical solutions that include productive roles for other vested nations in the region. Afghanistan's current position and potential future resolutions are complex. Afghanistan's largest challenge is possible future peace chances.

Western governments believe they can deliver democracy to Afghanistan, but the population has never been ruled democratically. A Western-focused administration will worsen if Afghan political and socioeconomic realities are ignored. U.S. officials must reevaluate their strategy for pulling soldiers out of Afghanistan. To prevent the United States from returning to Afghanistan after its departure, President Obama recently spoke about the need to reevaluate the ANSF's development (Report, 2020). Afghanistan looks more relevant to regional and global powers in 2015 and beyond, not merely because of its challenges but also because of its military, diplomatic, social, and economic possibilities. The post-2015 future for Afghanistan should involve minimizing instability, struggle, and war and promoting positive tendencies like state development and social, intellectual, and economic improvement.

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